1 The outcome of a major evolutionary transition is the aggregation of inde-2 pendent entities into a new synergetic level of organisation. Classical models 3 involve either pairwise interactions between individuals or a linear superposi-4 tion of these interactions. However, major evolutionary transitions display syn-5 ergetic effects: their outcome is not just the sum of its parts. Multiplayer games 6 can display such synergies, as their payoff can be different from the sum of any 7 collection of two-player interactions. Assuming that all interactions start from 8 pairs, how can synergetic multiplayer games emerge from simpler pairwise in-9
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Major evolutionary transitions share cooperation as a common theme: simple units aggregate to 18 form a new level of organisation in which individuals benefit others bearing a cost to themselves 19 (1, 2). However, from a Darwinian perspective, cooperation is difficult to explain, as natural selec-20 tion promotes selfishness rather than cooperation (3-7). The evolution of cooperation has often 21 been approached through the lens of simple two-player games that depict social dilemmas (8-22 10). The study of games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, or alternative situations such as the 23 Stag-Hunt game (11), have provided insightful views on which mechanisms are likely to promote 24 cooperation -e.g., spatial reciprocity, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection and 25 group selection (12-14). However, the simplicity of two-player games is a double-edged sword, 26 as these pairwise games may fail to capture the intricacies of complex interactions in real social 27 and biological systems. Evolutionary transitions typically involve multiple interaction partners at 28 the same time rather than a collection of pairwise interactions. For instance, when cells interact 29 to form a multicellular organism, a superposition of pairwise interactions is insufficient to capture 30 the intricacies of the complex organism. This is because an interaction among all the cells is not 31 just a sum of pairwise interactions. Synergetic interactions -the whole being more than the sum 32 of its parts -may be necessary to allow a high level of selection unit to emerge. Synergetic 33 interactions could then pave the way for the emergence of complex phenomena such as division 34 of labour or multicellularity. Therefore, understanding how synergetic interactions emerge is an 35 important part of our understanding of evolutionary transitions. case where m = 3, that is, when the sets contain three individuals. Let us assume that for two 74 individuals playing strategy A (B), each one obtains a payoff of a (d). Similarly, for two individuals 75 playing different strategies, the individual using strategy A obtains the payoff b and the individual 76 using strategy B obtains the payoff c. Given that there are three individuals in every set, the 77 payoff of an individual within a set is determined by two pairwise interactions. Therefore, the 78 payoff of an individual playing strategy A (B) in a set with j other individuals playing A is given by 79 a j = aj + b(2 j) (b j = cj + d(2 j)). Note that for m = 3, j = 0, 1, 2. Given that the breaking 80 probability of a specific set may depend on the number of A individuals within the set, the set 81 dynamics allows for non-uniform breaking probabilities across the sets. 82 To demonstrate that our simple model can indeed capture the emergence of synergy, we 83 consider two aspects: the accumulated payoff of both types and the evolutionary dynamics of 84 the two strategies. We find that non-uniform breaking probabilities across the sets foster the 85 emergence of synergetic multiplayer interactions. In other words, when the fragilities of the sets 86 are non-uniform we find that (i) the expected accumulated payoff of both strategies is consistent 87 with the one of a typical multiplayer game that cannot be decomposed into a pairwise game, and 88 (ii) the evolutionary dynamics of the strategies exhibit two internal equilibria of selection, which is 89 impossible in a two-player game. 90 The calculation of the average accumulated payoff in the general case is challenging, even 91 though the model is simple. We overcome this problem by assuming that the probability with 92 which the strategy is updated is small, w ⌧ 1. As a consequence, the set structure can reach its 93 stationary state -which determines the accumulated payoffs -before a strategy update occurs. 94 Importantly, the average accumulated payoffs for both strategies are consistent with the payoffs 95 of the following 3-player game in a well mixed population, up to a positive rescaling factor (see SI 96 Appendix, Section 2.1):
Here a i /k i+1 is the payoff for an individual using strategy A when it meets i opponents using 98 strategy A. Equivalently, b i /k i is the payoff for an individual using strategy B when it meets i 99 opponents using strategy A. The payoff table in Eq.(1) has two important features. First, the 100 derived multiplayer game is of the same size as that of the set. Second, the payoff entries are 101 proportional to the product of the accumulated payoff in a set and its lifetime. 102 The evolutionary outcome of both strategies can be predicted by the replicator equation for 103 a large class of microscopic imitation rules, if the population size is sufficiently large (see SI 104 Appendix, Section 2.2). The replicator equation is given by
are the payoffs for strategy A and B of the 3-player game based on Eq. (1), and x A is the fraction The above results on the accumulated payoffs and the evolutionary dynamics of strategies 113 hold for any set fragilities (k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ). In the following, we apply these results to homogenous 114 and heterogeneous set fragilities to address when and how synergetic interactions emerge. 115 Whenever the fragility of the sets is homogenous, k 0 = k 1 = k 2 = k 3 , Eq. (1) is identical 116 to the one of the original pairwise game, even though it is a 3-player game (see SI Appendix, 117 Section 2.2). Therefore there is no synergy effect in the payoffs. Given that the replicator equation 118 is equivalent to the one of the pairwise game, there is at most one internal equilibrium with the 119 same position and stability. The upper panel of Fig. 2 shows the agreement between the analytical 120 approximation and a simulation of the full model. 121 However, when fragilities are not homogeneous across the sets, Eq.(1) becomes a 3-player 122 game, which cannot be decomposed into additive pairwise interactions (lower panel of Fig. 2 ). 123 In this case, the payoff of an individual interacting with two opponents is not equal to the sum of 124 the two pairwise interactions ( Fig. 3) . Consequently, the presence of non-uniform set breaking 125 probabilities generates synergetic payoffs. Synergy emerges exclusively as a result of the evolu-126 tionary dynamics of the set structured population. In addition to this, the replicator equation has 127 two internal equilibria, which is not possible in pairwise interactions (see lower panel of Fig. 2 ).
128
Static random networks display similar effects (29). A necessary condition for the emergence of 129 two equilibria is that the sign of the effective payoff difference a i /k i+1 b i /k i changes twice with 130 the increase of the number of opponents using strategy A, i (30, 31). A more detailed analysis 131 on the conditions that lead to two internal equilibria can be found in SI Appendix, Section 2.2. If 132 one of the two equilibria is stable, the other has to be unstable. Given this, our model can explain 133 both the maintenance of biodiversity and phenotypic dominance within the same framework.
134
Pairwise games between n strategies 135 The model can be extended to account for an arbitrary number of strategies, n, instead of only 136 two. In the pairwise interactions with n strategies or an n ⇥ n game, the non-uniform breaking 137 probabilities also generate synergetic multiplayer interactions. Although the analytical calculations 138 are more intricate due to the increased number of set configurations, we find that the payoff matrix 139 of the emergent multiplayer game is consistent with the one of an n-strategy m-player game (SI 140 Appendix, Section 3.1). Interestingly, the intuition behind these payoff entries is similar to the ones 141 of the two-strategy case, as they still represent the product of the additive payoffs via pairwise 142 interactions and the duration of that set. In addition to this, the n-strategy m-player game has, at 143 most, (m 1) n 1 isolated internal equilibria, whereas the original n⇥n pairwise game has at most 144 one equilibrium (SI Appendix, Section 3.2). The dynamics in our model are thus rich enough to 145 capture complex phenomena exhibited by social and biological systems. Blue and red dots represent strategies A and B respectively. When m = 2 (left column) "sets" are actually "links" and the overall structure is a network (26). In this case, interactions are strictly pairwise, hence there is no synergetic effect in the payoffs. The right column shows the case with m = 3, which is the minimum set size that illustrates the emergence of synergetic interactions. With probability 1 w a set is selected at random (dashed lines). This set breaks up with probability k i , where i is the number of strategy A individuals in the set. If the set breaks, a randomly chosen individual is expelled. In order to keep the size of the set constant, another random individual is incorporated into the updated set (dashed lines).
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Non$%uniform%% fragility% (3) and (4) (lines) agree well the accumulated payoff obtained by simulation (symbols). This in turn proves that the synergetic 3-player game is intrinsically captured by Eqs.
(3) and (4) even term by term. Upper inset: Payoffs for equal abundance of both strategies. An individual with strategy A gains less if it interacts in a set which has 1 individual with strategy A than it were in the synergy free case (grey, dashed). Lower inset: An individual with strategy B gains much more if it interacts in a set which has 1 individual with strategy A than it were in the synergy free case (grey, dashed). Here the payoffs in the synergy free cases are the average values of the two payoff entries for the focal individual interacting with 0 and 2 A individuals. Thus, the interaction can no longer be decomposed into multiple pairwise interactions, which is how every individual obtains its payoff microscopically. (Parameters are the same as that in the lower panel of Fig. 2 the set composition is the number of individuals within the set playing a specific strategy. If the 23 set is broken, a random individual within the set is expelled, provided it is in at least one other set. 24 In order to keep the size of the set constant, another random individual is added to the focal set. 25 We start with the simplest pairwise games with two strategies, A and B. The 2 ⇥ 2 payoff 26 matrix is given by (a ij ) 2⇥2 , where a ij is the payoff of an individual playing strategy i with an 27 opponent playing strategy j, where i, j 2 {A, B}. We find that the average accumulated payoff for 28 each strategy is consistent with the one of a 2-strategy, m-player game up to a positive rescaling 29 factor. When the breaking probability of a set is uniform across all kinds of sets, the payoff of 30 the m-player game is equivalent to that of a sum of m 1 pairwise games. However, we notice 31 that whenever the sets have different breaking probabilities that depend on the set composition, 32 intrinsic multiplayer interactions emerge. In this case, the accumulated payoff of both strategies 33 cannot be decomposed into collections of pairwise games anymore. In other words, synergetic 34 effects in payoff can emerge from simple pairwise interactions. Based on accumulated payoffs, 35 we further obtain the replicator equation of the m-player game to determine the evolutionary fate 36 of each strategy. In addition to this, the replicator equation shows up to m 1 internal equilibria. 37 In contrast, for pairwise interaction there is at most one such equilibrium. These results are 38 obtained under the assumption of fast set dynamics -very few strategy updates occurs before 39 the population structure has reached the stationary state -and a large population size. 40 We generalise the above results for cases where the number of strategies, n, is greater than 41 two. In this case the payoff matrix is given by (a ij ) n⇥n , where i, j 2 {1, 2, . . . , n}. In this technically 42 somewhat more challenging case, we find similar results: Initially, i.e. at time t = 0, we call the l sets T 0 i , 1  i  l. For the first time step in the set evolution, 55 t = 1, we denote the selected set as T 0 i ⇤ . If this set is broken and transforms to another set, we 56 denote the transformed set as T 1 i ⇤ , otherwise the set is not broken and we let T 1 i ⇤ = T 0 i ⇤ . For the 57 other sets which are not selected, we denote T 1 i = T 0 i , i 6 = i ⇤ . Recursively, we define T t i for t 0 58 and 1  i  l.
59
Let (T t i ) be the number of strategy A individuals in set T t i , thus 0  (T t i )  m. For each set 60 i, the dynamics of (T t i ) is a Markov chain in state space {0, 1, 2 · · · m} with the transition matrix
where I m+1 is the identity matrix of size m+1 and V is the transition matrix when set i is selected. 62 Hence 
[4]
As j m j = m m 1 j 1 , Eq. (4) can be written as
[5]
Similarly, we have
where b s = a BA s + a BB (m 1 s) is the accumulated payoff of an individual using strategy B 79 gets in a set consisting of s individuals using strategy A. When m = 2, the population strcture is equivalent to a network and the sets represent links. 94 In this case, the effective payoff table in Eq. (8) is still a pairwise game. This transformation can 95 alter the effective payoff of both strategies, however it cannot lead to synergetic effect in payoffs 96 as there is only one pairwise interaction in the transformed table. When m = 3, the emergent 97 payoff table is consistent with a 3-player game. On one hand, we can take the payoff entries as 98 the synergetic payoff of two individuals. On the other hand, we have the additive payoffs via the 99 two pairwise interactions in that set. A comparison between these two payoffs can facilitate us to 100 study when "the whole is better than the sum of its parts", i.e., the synergetic payoff is better off 101 than that derived by two pairwise interactions. 102 When the set breaking probabilities are uniform -i.e., k i is constant -, we find -by Eq. (6) 103 and Eq. (7) -that the accumulated payoffs for strategy A and B are f
. That is to say that the emergent payoff is equivalent to the sum 105 of the corresponding m 1 pairwise game and therefore there is no synergy. However, when the 106 set breaking probabilities are non-uniform, intrinsic multiple player games emerge. In this case 107 the "whole" is different from the sum of its parts. 
Here ⇠ is the white Gaussian noise, f A (Eq. 6) and f B (Eq. 7) are the average accumulated 112 payoffs for strategy A and B, respectively. In addition, g is the imitation function capturing the 113 likelyhood of the focal individual to adopt the strategy of the opponent's and is the selection 114 intensity (4). Throughout, g 0 is positive, implying that individuals are likely to adopt the strategy of 115 individuals with high payoffs. In particular, the Fermi update rule is an imitation update rule with 116 the imitation function g(x) = [1 + exp( x)] 1 .
117
For large population size N , the stochastic term vanishes and we obtain 118ẋ
[10]
Note that 1 
[11]
Therefore, the evolution of a pairwise game on the evolving set structured population is cap- where x 2 (0, 1). By the variation diminishing property (6) we know that the number of the internal 128 roots is equal to the number of sign changes of ( d 0 , d 1 · · · , d m 1 ), or less by an even number. 129 In particular, when there is only one sign change in the sequence ( d 0 , d 1 · · · , d m 1 ), there d 2 ) + ( d 1 d 0 )) 2 (0, 1). Therefore, the Bernstein polynomial is positive at
To sum up, there are two internal equilibria if and only if either of the two conditions holds 142 d 0 < 0
3 Games with n strategies 144 In the above section we assumed that each individual plays a pairwise game with its opponent. 145 In addition, every individual can choose only between 2 strategies. In this section, we allow 146 individuals to choose any number of strategies and thus generalise our analysis to n strategies. 147 In this case, the pairwise interaction becomes an n ⇥ n game. We show that the previous results 148 also hold for n strategies when the set dynamics are fast enough as, (i) the accumulated payoff for 149 any strategy is an m-player game and (ii) the evolutionary dynamics of strategies can be captured 150 by the replicator equation of the n-strategy m-player game. 156 We start by randomly choosing one of the l sets, namely i. Then we define a sequence of 157 sets T t i (t 0). Here the set T t i evolves into T t+1 i . The type of the set T t i -i.e., (T t i ) -is a 158 Markov chain whose states are given by the possible set configurations. These set configurations 159 can be denoted as the simplex
where ↵ s is the number of strategy s individuals in the corresponding set. The transition matrix of 161 this Markov chain is given by
where I is the identity matrix of size |S n,m |. Here |S n,m | is the cardinal number of set S n,m . V 163 is the transition matrix conditioned on the fact that the set i is selected. By the updating rule of 164 the sets, two subsequent sets T t i and T t+1 i have at least m 1 individuals in common. Thus the 165 transition is impossible between two states (↵ 1 , ↵ 2 · · · , ↵ n ) and (↵ 0 1 , ↵ 0 2 · · · , ↵ 0 n ), unless either of 166 the following two cases holds.
167
• There exist two different strategies s 1 and s 2 such that ↵ 0 s2 = ↵ s2 + 1 and ↵ 0 s1 = ↵ In the first case, the selected set is broken; one individual playing strategy s 1 is expelled and 171 one individual with strategy s 2 is incorporated to the set. In order to illustrate this case, we take 172 the transition from (↵ 1 , ↵ 2 · · · , ↵ n ) to (↵ 1 + 1, ↵ 2 · · · , ↵ n 1) as an example. First, a set consisting 173 of ↵ s strategy s individuals is selected, and then breaks with probability k (↵1,↵2··· ,↵n) . Second, a 174 strategy n individual is expelled (with probability ↵ n /m). Finally, a strategy 1 individual is incor-175 porated (with probability x A , i.e., the fraction of strategy 1 in the population). Thus the transition 176 probability is ↵ n x A k (↵1,↵2··· ,↵n) /m. Similarly, the transition probability from state (↵ 1 , ↵ 2 · · · , ↵ n )
to (↵ 0 1 , ↵ 0 2 · · · , ↵ 0 n ), where the two states fulfill the first constraint, is given by ↵2··· ,↵n) .
[16]
The second case reveals that the two subsequent states are equivalent. Either the selected 179 set is not broken or it is broken but the expelled individual and the new individual are the same in 180 type. In this case, the transition probability can be obtained by the normalisation property of V -181 i.e., one minus the sum of all the other transition probabilities in Eq. (16). 182 When all the strategies coexist, i.e., ⇧ n i=1 x i 6 = 0, the transition matrix Q is aperiodic and 183 irreducible, consequently the Markov chain presents a unique stationary distribution. By Eq. (15), 184 the stationary distribution of Q is the same as that of V . This holds for any number of total links 185 l. However, the size of the state space |S n,m | is n+m 1 m (7). As a consequence, the number 186 of states increases much more rapidly with the set size when there are more than two types of 187 strategies in the population (Fig (2) ). Given this, it becomes challenging to calculate the stationary 188 distribution for multiple strategies. Still, as shown in (8), for general n⇥n games and the dynamical 189 network m = 2, we have i) that the stationary distribution is a binomial distribution weighted by the 190 duration time, ii) that the conditional transition matrix V satisfies the detailed balance condition. 191 This binomial distribution arises from the network structure, which is a special case, m = 2, of our 192 set structure. It turns out that these results can be generalised for m 2. 
x ↵i i is a normalisation factor. 196 • The Markov chain V fulfills the detailed balance condition, i.e., 197 y (↵1,↵2,··· ,↵n) V ((↵1,↵2,··· ,↵n),(↵ 0
We prove that the distribution Eq. (17) satisfies the detailed balance condition. 198 If the transition from state (↵ 1 , ↵ 2 , · · · , ↵ n ) to state (↵ 0 1 , ↵ 0 2 · · · , ↵ 0 n ) is impossible, then the 199 reverse transition is also impossible. Thus, Eq. (18) holds. In the other cases, the transition is 200 possible. Therefore, the two states (↵ 1 , ↵ 2 , · · · , ↵ n ) and (↵ 0 1 , ↵ 0 2 · · · , ↵ 0 n ) must satisfy one of the 201 two constraints of the transition matrix. 202 If they fulfill the first constraint, i.e., there exist two different strategies s 1 and s 2 such that
1; for all the other strategies s, ↵ 0 s = ↵ s . By Eqs. (16) and (17) we 204 have that 205 y (↵1,↵2,··· ,↵n) V ((↵1,↵2,··· ,↵n),(↵ 0 
where ij is the Kronecker-delta and N is the population size. 
⌘i .
[21]
Considering that 
Let↵ k = ↵ k ik , (↵ 1 ,↵ 2 , · · · ,↵ n ) be the co-player configuration of a strategy i individual in a set (↵ 1 , ↵ 2 , · · · , ↵ n ). Eq. (22) is given by 
Frequency)of)strategy)A)Individuals))
Rescaled)selec7on)gradient))ẋ A /(x A (1 x A )) Figure 1 : Rescaled selection gradientẋ1/(xA(1 xA)). The simulation based on the Fermi update rule (dots) shows that it has two roots. The analytical approximation (Eq.(10)) captures the equilibria of the selection gradient by simulation x ⇤ A ⇡ 0.13 and 0.46 (red dots). The absolute value of the selection gradient, however, is systematically overestimated by the theoretical approximation for the positive selection gradient. This is because there is a heterogeneity in payoffs within the population using the same strategy. Let us assume that Q(f ⇤ A , f ⇤ B ) is the probability that a strategy A individual is of payoff f ⇤ A and a strategy B individual is of payoff f ⇤ B . Then the selection gradient based on simulation is an estimator of P
Since tanh(x) is convex for x > 0, thus the theoretical approximation tanh( 2 (fA fB)) = tanh( P
) is greater than the estimator of the simulation P
. By similar arguments, we obtain that the theoretical approximation underestimates the simulation result for negative selection gradient. Each blue dot in the plot is the average of 100 independent realisations. Every realisation takes 10 7 generation. For the first 10 4 generations of each realisation, only set dynamics occur. After that, with a probability of w = 10 3 two individuals are chosen randomly from the entire population. We keep track of the transition without implementing them. We denote y and z as the number of times that an individual playing strategy A and B changes its strategy. z y Q is the estimator of the selection gradientẋ A, where Q is the number of strategy updating events in this realisation. (Parameters: Stag-Hunt game with aAA = 2, aAB = 1, aBA = 1.5 and aBB = 7. Population size, N = 500, number of sets, l = 1000, probability of a strategy update, w = 10 3 . Selection intensity, = 0.1. The breaking probabilities are ki = (1 + 10i) 1 , where i is the number of strategy A individuals in the set.) = (m+2)(m+1) 2 set configurations. In general, the number of the states increases rapidly with the size of the set, if the strategy number increases.
Set size m
